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What does It Mean to be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation
SIFFERD, Katrina L. - Personal Name
mindbody relationship: John Searle’s non-reductivism, which claims that conscious mental
states are causal yet not reducible to their underlying brain states. Searle’s position has
been roundly criticized, with some arguing the theory taken as a whole is incoherent. In
this paper I review these criticisms and add my own, concluding that Searle’s position is
indeed contradictory, both internally and with regard to Morse’s other views. Thus I argue
that Morse ought to abandon Searle’s non-reductive theory. Instead, I claim Morse ought
to adopt a non-eliminative reductive account that can more easily support his realism about
folk psychological states, and the existence of causally effective mental states in a purely
physical world.
EB00000004391K | Available |
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E-Jurnal
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Subject(s)
Responsibility
Stephen Morse
Mind–body relationship
Non-reductive theory R
Non-eliminative reductive theory
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Statement of Responsibility
Katrina L. Sifferd