Our question is this: What makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard
distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their
capacities as (or as deputies of) law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is
not. We aim to provide a definition of entrapment that covers both and which, for reasons
we explain, does not settle questions of permissibility and culpability. We explain, compare,
and contrast two existing definitions of legal entrapment to commit a crime that
possess this neutrality. We point out some problems with the extensional correctness of
these definitions and propose a new definition that resolves these problems. We then extend
our definition to provide a more general definition of entrapment, encompassing both civil
and legal cases. Our definition is, we believe, closer to being extensionally correct and will,
we hope, provide a clearer basis for future discussions about the ethics of entrapment than
do the definitions upon which it improves.

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• The Concept of Entrapment