OPAC (Online Public Access Catalog)
Pencarian Koleksi UPA Perpustakaan
start it by typing one or more keywords for title, author or subject
Morse, Mind, and Mental Causation
S. PARDO, Michael • - Personal Name
PATTERSON, Dennis - Personal Name
Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a
‘‘folk psychological’’ account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations
for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of ‘‘mental
state causation,’’ in which mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) cause
behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility.
We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental
causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we present an alternative account to
explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions (the ‘‘rational–teleological’’
account). We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise
for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal
responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of ‘‘mental state causation’’
is not necessary to support legal responsibility.
‘‘folk psychological’’ account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations
for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of ‘‘mental
state causation,’’ in which mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) cause
behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility.
We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental
causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we present an alternative account to
explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions (the ‘‘rational–teleological’’
account). We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise
for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal
responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of ‘‘mental state causation’’
is not necessary to support legal responsibility.
Availability
| EB00000004034K | Available | ||
| EB00000004036K | Available |
Detail Information
Series Title
-
Call Number
-
Publisher
: ,
Collation
-
Language
ISBN/ISSN
-
Classification
NONE
Detail Information
Content Type
E-Jurnal
Media Type
-
Carrier Type
-
Edition
-
Specific Detail Info
-
Statement of Responsibility
Dennis Patterson
No other version available
File Attachment
