In a recent paper in this journal, Gideon Yaffe provides an expected utility
model of culpability in order to explain why willfully ignorant misconduct sometimes is
just as culpable as knowing misconduct. Although promising, I argue here that challenges
remain for Yaffe’s view. First, I argue that Yaffe’s proof of the equal culpability of willful
ignorance and knowledge is not watertight in certain realistic cases. Next, I argue that
Yaffe’s view of culpability is motive-sensitive in a way that sits uncomfortably with
criminal law doctrine, and I show that his view has difficulty with unjustified actions that
are nonetheless privileged. Perhaps these problems can be solved by modifying Yaffe’s
account using the notion of legally recognized reasons. However, I argue that difficulties
remain when it comes to implementing this solution into Yaffe’s mathematical model.
Finally, I raise concerns about Yaffe’s account of willful ignorance in particular. While his
view initially seems to have a major advantage over the additive picture of willful ignorance
I’ve defended, this advantage does not stand up under scrutiny. In fact, Yaffe likely
relies (albeit covertly) on an additive metaphysical picture of willful ignorance as well.

EB00000003852K			Available
EB00000003851K			Available

• Ignorance Lost: A Reply to Yaffe on the Culpability of Willful Ignorance