This paper presents a case study of the English noun amount, a word that
ostensibly relies on measurement in its semantics, yet stands apart from other quantizing
nouns on the basis of its existential interpretation. John ate the amount of apples
that Bill ate does not mean John and Bill ate the same apples, but rather that they each
ate apples in the same quantity. Amount makes reference to abstract representations
of measurement, that is, to degrees. Its existential interpretation evidences the fact
that degrees contain information about the objects that instantiate them. Outside the
domain of nominal measurement, the noun kind exhibits behavior strikingly similar
to that of amount; both yield an existential interpretation. This observation motivates
re-conceiving of degrees as nominalized quantity-uniform properties—the same
sort of entity as kinds. Thus, the semantic machinery handling kinds also handles
degrees: as nominalized properties, degrees are instantiated by objects that hold the
corresponding property; when instantiated by real-world objects, degrees (and kinds)
deliver the existential interpretation

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• A new kind of degree